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Abstract 
Fiscal constraints and policy changes to improve the effectiveness of programmes in reducing poverty 
have gradually led the international community to use tools to reach the poor. Poverty reduction policy 
targeting is one of them. This paper reviews targeted poverty alleviation policies in developing 
countries and seeks to identify the key factors that affect their performances. 
Key words : Targeting, poverty, redistribution, developing countries. 
Résumé 
Dans un contexte de ressources budgétaires limitées et suite au constat que la croissance et l’aide 
publique au développement ne bénéficiaient pas forcément aux pauvres, la communauté internationale 
a eu recours à des outils spécifiques permettant d’atteindre en priorité les pauvres. Le ciblage des 
politiques de lutte contre la pauvreté est l’un de ces outils. Cet article vise à dresser un bilan des 
expériences de ciblage menées dans les pays en développement. Il cherche pour cela à dégager  les 
facteurs de réussite ou d’échec de ces expériences et fait le point sur les questions qui font toujours 
débat. 
Mots clés : Ciblage, pauvreté, redistribution, pays en développement. 
JEL Classification : I38, O12, H23. 
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Introduction 
With the impending deadline set by the international community to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals and especially reduce extreme poverty, the time has come to look at the 
performances of poverty alleviation policies. A number of these policies are targeted. The term 
“targeting” refers to concentrating the poverty reduction programme’s resources on the poor or most 
vulnerable populations. The use of targeted policies in developing countries started in the 1980s to 
offset the structural adjustment programmes’ effects on living conditions while maintaining the fiscal 
restraint imposed by these programmes. The 1990s saw a turnaround in aid to the developing countries 
culminating in poverty alleviation being one of the international community’s main goals. Targeting 
no longer plays a supporting role, but is now a fully-fledged tool in the quest for more effective 
poverty reduction. Targeting can indeed be particularly appealing where resources are scarce, since 
greater poverty reduction is believed to be achieved if resources are concentrated among poor 
households rather than spread across the entire population under a universal policy. 
 
Nevertheless, poverty alleviation policy targeting raises a host of practical, ethical and political 
problems, especially in developing countries. The very identification of the households or individuals 
to be targeted is problematic. It calls for consideration of the resources required and costs associated 
with the identification of the targeted populations. Moreover, targeting is actually a complex 
instrument covering a wide range of mechanisms designed to select individuals, households and even 
population groups defined by geographic or demographic criteria (women, children, the elderly and 
ethnic minorities). 
 
The purpose of this study is to review targeting experiences in developing countries drawing on the 
large body of academic and operational literature that has grown up around this subject since the 
1990s. It sets out, more specifically, to identify the key factors affecting targeting performance and 
take stock of the questions still being debated today. First, however, note that the World Bank 
dominates thinking on targeting. In fact, most of the studies on this subject have been produced by its 
members. 
 
This study is laid out as follows. The first section presents the conceptual framework surrounding 
targeting efficiency. The second section sets out the problems raised by the implementation of targeted 
poverty reduction policies. The third section provides an overview of the different poverty alleviation 
policy targeting mechanisms. This section looks at the respective advantages and disadvantages of 
these different methods and the conditions required to implement them and maximise their 
effectiveness. Lastly, the fourth section sums up the lessons that can be drawn from the poverty 
reduction policy targeting experiences in developing countries. 
 
1 Targeting: an ideal tool in theory … 
Fiscal constraints and the realisation that growth and official development assistance were not 
necessarily helping the poor have led the international community to use tools to reach the poor. 
Poverty reduction policy targeting is one of these tools. 
1.1 Definition of targeting 
What can be done to make the poor the prime beneficiaries of poverty reduction policies? Two 
solutions are possible. The first is to invest poverty alleviation resources in the sectors that help the 
poor the most, such as primary education and primary healthcare.1 The second solution is to identify 
the poor to be able to allocate the benefits of a programme exclusively to them. In this way, the poor 
are “targeted” such that they are the sole beneficiaries of the programme or policy. One possible 
definition of poverty reduction policy targeting is hence the selection of individuals or households 
considered to be poor from among the population. 
                                                 
1 This type of policy is often called “broad targeting”, as opposed to the “narrow targeting” studied in this paper. 
See Van de Walle (1998), for example, for a discussion of “broad targeting”. 
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Although targeting can be geared to different concepts of poverty, targeted policies generally adopt the 
monetary approach. This approach defines as poor those individuals or households whose income is 
below a certain threshold. Nevertheless, other approaches to poverty can be taken such as basic needs 
or capabilities, to coin the terms used by Amartya Sen. 
 
Among the poverty alleviation policies, targeting generally applies to policies in the social sectors 
such as education, healthcare and nutrition. It can also concern infrastructure development, energy 
distribution and water supply policies, and, in a more cross-cutting manner, urban and rural 
development policies. It is not so much the sector as the type of intervention that determines whether a 
policy can be targeted. Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2003) define five types of interventions 
particularly suited to targeting: direct cash transfers, in-kind transfers, public works, price subsidies 
and social funds2 (these intervention types are presented in detail in Table 1). Three of them – direct 
cash transfers, in-kind transfers and public works – have the particularity of being able to be 
conditioned on the recipients’ compliance with certain obligations such as sending their children to 
school and taking them for health check-ups. 
 
Table 1: The types of intervention suited to targeting 
 
Type of 
intervention 
Description Possibility of 
conditionality 
Direct cash 
transfers  
Pay money to targeted individuals or households regularly or 
on an ad-hoc basis 
Yes 
Transfers in 
kind 
Offer the targeted population transfers in the form of free 
meals, nutritional supplements or food stamps, healthcare, 
registration fee waivers, etc. 
Yes 
Targeted 
subsidies  
Subsidise poor households’ consumption of certain goods such 
as water, gas, electricity, foodstuffs, building materials, 
healthcare and loans 
Yes 
Public works Offer the targeted population public works employment in 
exchange for a wage or food 
Yes 
Social funds  Invest in infrastructures intended for the poor No 
Source: The authors, adapted from the classification proposed by Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2003) 
 
1.2 The theoretical effectiveness of targeting 
Targeting is geared to the challenges of poverty alleviation in two ways. Firstly, it allows for 
programmes to be put in place that are specifically designed to meet the needs of the poor. Secondly, 
by concentrating the resources among the poor, targeting offers a more efficient use of resources than 
a universal policy. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates this second point in graph form assuming perfect access to information. This strong 
hypothesis implies that each individual’s income can be identified accurately and at zero cost. The 
graph’s ordinate is income Y observed among the population. Its abscissa is the population ranked by 
income level. The line (Ymin Ymax) represents the initial distribution of income corresponding to each 
centile of the distribution. Denoting by z the poverty line, we obtain in Z  that %P of the population 
has an income below or on the poverty line.  
 
  
                                                 
2 This classification has the advantage of homing in on the intervention types suited to targeting. However, the 
classification’s internal consistency is debatable. For example, social funds can partially cover the other types of 
interventions, especially when they are used to finance public works programmes or transfers. Public works 
could be seen as a transfer in cash or in kind conditional on the work of the defined public works programmes. 
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Figure 1: Representation of the distributive effects of a targeted poverty reduction programme 
and a universal poverty reduction programme 
 
 
Let’s assume that the government puts in place a universal direct cash transfer policy, i.e. that it 
allocates the same sum of transfers to all individuals. This policy is reflected by a new income 
distribution represented on the graph by the line ( 'UU ), parallel to the initial distribution. 
 
Let’s now assume that the government uses the same budget to implement a policy of targeted cash 
transfers, i.e. that it allocates a transfer solely to those people below the poverty line. Let’s assume, 
moreover, that the sum of this transfer is equal to the difference between the poverty line and their 
income. This policy affects solely the incomes of the poor and is reflected by a new income 
distribution for the poorest P% represented by segment zZ. The population’s new income distribution 
is made up of the segments [zZ] and [ZYmax]. 
 
For a given budget (area A equals area C), this graph shows the targeted policy’s superiority at 
reducing poverty. The programme of universal transfers may well have reduced the proportion of poor 
from P to P’. The poverty gap3, equal before any transfers to the area (A+B), the grey area on the 
graph, has been reduced by area B (striped area). However, part of the transfers for a sum equal to area 
C has been paid to individuals living above the poverty line, which is totally ineffectual for poverty 
alleviation. In the case of the targeted transfers, the sum of transfers has eradicated poverty since both 
the number of poor and the poverty gap now stand at zero (reduction of the poverty gap equal to 
A+B). Moreover, the transfers have been exclusively directed at those who need them the most. 
 
Therefore, in a situation of perfect information and assuming there is no change in behaviour, targeted 
policies are indisputably preferable to universal allocation policies since they increase the 
programme’s poverty reduction effectiveness for the same cost. 
                                                 
3 The poverty gap is the total sum of transfers that would need to be paid to poor households for them to break 
out of poverty, i.e. for each poor household’s income to be at least equal to the poverty line. 
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2 … hard to implement in practice 
 
In theory, for a given budget, concentrating poverty reduction action among poor households or 
individuals is the most effective way to reduce poverty. In practice, a number of elements complicate 
the implementation of targeted policies and can alter their effects. The situation of each household or 
individual with regard to poverty is not normally known. Targeting therefore has to identify who is 
poor and who is not poor. This identification is never perfect. It has to contend with the complexity 
and different costs of the mechanisms used to bring to light or collect information on the individuals’ 
poverty levels. Secondly, by excluding part of the population from the beneficiaries, targeting deprives 
the targeted policy of political support. This lack of support can find expression in the underfunding or 
shelving of targeted policies. 
2.1 Imperfect access to information 
Contrary to the theoretical example presented above, we live in a world of imperfect information. 
Consequently, poverty reduction programme administrators do not normally know who the poor are. 
The strategies they put in place cannot perfectly identify the poor. Imperfect information hence 
exposes targeting to two types of identification errors: inclusion errors and exclusion errors.4 
 
Inclusion errors, also known as Type II errors (Smolensky et al., 1995) or E-mistakes for “Excessive 
coverage” (Cornia and Stewart, 1995), occur when persons who are not initially targeted benefit from 
the programme or policy. In the case of a programme targeting the poor, inclusion errors concern all 
non-poor individuals benefiting from the programme. This is represented in Table 2 by the value NPB 
equal to the number of non-poor ( NP ) benefiting from the programme. 
 
Exclusion errors, also known as Type I errors or F-mistakes for “Failure to cover”, occur when 
targeted persons do not benefit from the programme, i.e. poor individuals are excluded from the 
programme. The exclusion error is measured in Table 2 by the value PNB, which is the number of poor 
( P ) not benefiting from the programme. 
The worst targeting occurs when no poor individual is reached while all the non-poor benefit from the 
programme. Conversely, the best targeting occurs when the two identification errors equal zero: NPB = 
PNB = 0.  
 
Table 2: Targeting errors 
  Poor Non-poor 
Population of beneficiaries PB NP
B 
Inclusion error (II) 
Population of non-beneficiaries P
NB
Exclusion error (I) NP
NB 
 
In practice, no targeting produces either of these extremes, especially the sought-after extreme 
whereby the two errors are zero. Yet the effectiveness of a poverty reduction policy is sensitive to both 
of these types of errors. Inclusion errors waste resources in that part of the programme’s resources are 
transferred to people who should not receive them. These errors therefore raise the cost of the 
programme without improving its effectiveness. They also reduce the programme’s vertical efficiency. 
By transferring resources to non-poor individuals, the programme increases vertical inequalities, i.e. 
inequalities between individuals with different incomes, here the poor and the non-poor (Ravallion, 
2004). 
 
Exclusion errors reduce the programme’s cost, but diminish its efficiency since part of the transfers do 
not reach the persons targeted by the programme. The programme’s poverty alleviation impact 
decreases in proportion. These errors moreover impede the programme’s horizontal efficiency by 
                                                 
4 The distinction between the two types of errors can be found in the literature in 1970, in an article by Weisbrod 
who defines the vertical and horizontal efficiency of targeting. 
7 
creating inequalities between individuals with the same incomes before the programme was put in 
place. These horizontal inequalities can create resentment and social instability (Bibi and Duclos, 
2007). 
 
Inclusion and exclusion errors need to be minimised if the effectiveness of the targeted policies is to 
be improved. However, it is hard to reduce one type of error without increasing the other. So a trade-
off between the two types of error is often necessary. Basically, the definition of extremely strict 
targeting criteria reduces waste (leakage), but generally undercuts the coverage of poor individuals 
(undercoverage).5 On the other hand, broadening the targeted population coverage generally results in 
part of the non-targeted population being included. The extreme example is where a universal policy 
reaches all the poor, but also all the non-poor and therefore maximises the inclusion errors. 
2.2 Information hide-and-seek 
Imperfect information means that instruments have to be found to separate out the poor from the non-
poor. In practice, two tools have been developed to this end: self-targeting and the collection of 
information on household living conditions.6 
 
Self-targeting consists of providing incentives to encourage participation by the poor while 
discouraging participation by the non-poor. In other words, these incentives lead the poor, via their 
participation in the programme, to disclose their living conditions. The incentives are such that the 
costs of participating in the programme differ between the poor and the non-poor, with the costs being 
higher for the non-poor.7 The purpose of collecting information on household living conditions,8 
however, is to determine whether programme candidates satisfy the eligibility conditions. 
 
Yet neither of these two instruments is perfect. The effectiveness of self-targeting programmes 
critically depends on the validity of the assumption on which the self-targeting mechanism is based. If 
the differences in the costs of programme participation are small, the non-poor can benefit from the 
programme just as much as the poor, if not more if they are better informed. In addition, self-targeting 
mechanisms can prove particularly stigmatising for poor households. If the loss of social standing 
induced by participating in the programme has too high a psychological or social cost for certain poor 
households, then the self-targeting mechanism can end up excluding targeted beneficiaries. 
 
In the case of using information on household living conditions, targeting efficiency – or more 
generally programme effectiveness – depends to a large extent on the quality of the available or 
collected data. Data quality is closely associated with a country’s institutional capacities. The 
collection of high-quality data calls for skilled manpower, considerable statistical capabilities, but 
often also substantial management, financial control and logistical capacities. Yet these resources are 
relatively thin on the ground in low-income countries (Smith and Subbarao, 2003). The efficiency of 
targeting using information on living conditions is therefore closely linked with the institutional 
capacities of the country in which it is implemented. 
 
Irrespective of whether the data are collected or already exist, another risk lies in the disincentive 
effects of setting an eligibility criterion: individuals may be encouraged to change their behaviour to 
benefit from a targeted policy. For example, non-poor households may move to meet targeted policy 
selection criteria based on a geographic criterion. When targeting calls for data collection, a 
programme open solely to households with income below a certain threshold may prompt some 
                                                 
5 The reasons for this exclusion of poor individuals depend on the targeting method and are consequently 
presented in the sections describing these methods. 
6 The term “living conditions” is used here to broadly cover a number of definitions of poverty. Depending on 
the given programme’s definition of poverty, the information will concern household consumption or income, 
satisfaction of basic needs, access to infrastructures, etc. 
7 This targeting method is described in detail in Section 3.3. 
8 Depending on the targeting methods used, which are detailed in the following section, information is collected 
either by the programme or upstream where the programme uses already existing data. 
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households to falsify their income information or rein in their labour supply. This problem is found 
particularly with households whose income is close to the eligibility threshold: earning a little less 
money makes them eligible for the programme; earning a little more disqualifies them, which raises 
the opportunity cost of working. One solution to reduce the disincentive effects of programmes 
targeted using a selection criterion is to refrain from revealing exactly what this criterion is. This, 
however, undermines the programme’s transparency. And a lack of transparency gives the agents in 
charge of implementing the programme more discretionary leeway, which could create a breeding 
ground for corruption and generate suspicion of the programme (Lipsky, 1980). Behavioural changes 
can therefore either hamper targeting efficiency by including non-poor individuals in a programme’s 
recipients, or push up the cost of the policy when households replace their income source with the 
policy’s benefits. 
 
Last but by no means least, the third drawback of targeting using information on household living 
conditions is the cost for the programme’s potential recipients and its operator of collecting the 
information. Even when no specific information collection is organised, potential beneficiaries are 
asked to provide the information required to prove their eligibility for the programme: potential 
recipients generally have to actually go to the programme offices and present all the documents to 
provide evidence of their eligibility (ID, proof of residence, certificate of disability, etc.). These 
formalities represent a cost in that the individuals have to pay for some of these papers and also that it 
takes them time to put them together. These private costs can not only increase the exclusion errors by 
discouraging potential recipients from participating in the programme, but also reduce the 
programme’s net benefits for the poor since part of the resources allocated to them are used to cover 
their private participation costs.9 Information collection is also potentially expensive for the 
organisation in charge of implementing the targeted policy. The potentially prohibitive cost of 
identifying beneficiaries is incidentally one of the main criticisms made of targeted programmes. The 
large chunk that this cost can take out of the programme budget is alleged to substantially reduce 
transfers to the poor and consequently the poverty reduction performances of the targeted policies. 
 
Due to a lack of data, few empirical studies analyse the costs of targeting and their weight in the total 
costs of targeted programmes in developing countries. However, those studies that do so tend to play 
down the magnitude of targeting costs. A study by Grosh (1994) on 30 targeted programmes in Latin 
America shows that the direct costs of targeting, i.e. of identifying the beneficiaries, account for just 
0.4% to 8% of the total programme costs, with a median cost of 1%. A study by Caldés et al. (2004) of 
the costs of three Latin American targeted conditional transfer programmes10 shows that beneficiary 
identification is not the main cost involved in targeted programmes (Figure 2). Identification 
represents, on average, 22% of the total programme cost as opposed to 30% for monitoring and 
evaluation activities.11 Their study also shows that cost structure varies considerably from one 
programme to the next. For example, identification costs accounted for 34% of the PROGRESA 
programme’s total cost in its early years, compared with 12% for the pilot RPS programme. Lastly, the 
authors point out that although beneficiary identification costs account for a large share of programme 
costs, these fall off as the programme proceeds.  
                                                 
9 Several studies have been made of the costs involved in applying for a targeted welfare programme, including 
Duclos (1995), Moffit (1983) and Hernandez, Pudney and Hancock (2007). These studies focus exclusively on 
British and American welfare programmes, with contrasting findings. For example, Duclos shows that claiming 
supplementary benefit in the UK cost a single pensioner £3-4 per week and a couple of pensioners £20 per week 
in 1985. Hernandez, Pudney and Hancock’s findings on income support for pensioners in 1997-1998 and 2001-
2002 are more moderate. The costs estimated are around £3-4 per week for an average recipient. 
10 These programmes are: the Programa Nacional de Educación, Salud y Alimentación (PROGRESA) in 
Mexico, the Programa de Asignación Familiar-Fase II (PRAF) in Honduras, and the Red de Protección Social 
(RPS) in Nicaragua. These programmes focus exclusively on education and health, and have relatively similar 
complex targeting methods (geographic and individual for PROGRESA and the pilot RPS, and geographic and 
category-based for PRAF). 
11 Grosh finds very different results to Caldés et al. Bear in mind, however, that Grosh’s study covers a larger 
number of programmes and that Caldés et al.’s study analyses large-scale complex programmes (PROGRESA 
covered more than two and a half million rural inhabitants nationwide in Mexico in 1999). 
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Tuck and Lindert (1996) explain how an information campaign in Tunisia in 1989 helped get the 
public to accept the shift from a universal food aid programme to a targeted programme.12 This 
information campaign, launched several months before the reform, explained the weight and 
inefficiency of the universal programme and detailed the targeted measures to be gradually rolled out. 
Tuck and Lindert report that an opinion poll conducted just before the reform found that most of the 
Tunisian public felt that the previous programme was too expensive and were convinced of the need 
for the reforms. 
 
Van de Walle (1998) points out that it is also possible to change the design of targeted programmes, 
since public opinion is generally less hostile to the targeting of transfers in kind and workfare 
programmes than to the targeting of cash transfers. 
2.4 Is targeting always the answer? 
 
The problems involved in the practicalities of targeting have two effects on the performances of 
targeted policies. They reduce targeting efficiency by introducing inclusion and exclusion errors into 
the identification of the targeted population. This occurs in particular in the case of poor quality data, 
flawed self-targeting assumptions, substantial manipulation of information by the households, and 
when the private costs of participating in the programme (stigma, opportunity costs and transaction 
costs) are too high. Moreover, they can reduce the programme’s impact on poverty by raising its costs 
and hence reducing the benefits reaching the poor. This is observed in the presence of disincentive 
effects on households, high information collection costs, high private costs and weak political 
support.13 Where these problems are too sizeable, targeting can prove less effective at reducing 
poverty than a universal policy. 
 
Some authors (Datt and Ravallion, 1995; Murgai and Ravallion, 2005) draw on empirical data to show 
that targeted policies are not necessarily more effective at reducing poverty than universal policies. 
Datt and Ravallion (1995), for example, compare the poverty impact of the targeted Maharashtra 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (India) with the effect that would have been induced by a policy with 
the same budget paying a uniform transfer sum to the entire population. This targeted poverty 
alleviation programme operates on the basis of self-targeting. It provides jobs paying wages held to be 
too low to interest non-poor groups. The authors econometrically estimate the opportunity cost to the 
households of taking part in the programme, i.e. the cost associated with giving up farming and 
household tasks. Taking these costs into account, Datt and Ravallion (1995) show that the targeted 
policy has less of an impact on poverty than the universal policy. Yet this study has its limitations in 
that it considers neither the targeted programme’s positive externalities on poverty, due to the 
development of infrastructures, nor the disincentive effects that the universal policy could have on the 
households’ labour supply. 
 
To conclude, targeting emerges as a potentially high effective poverty reduction tool. Its performance 
depends to a great extent on how well it is implemented. Successful targeting can accurately identify 
the poor without costing too much either to the beneficiaries or the programme operator. Although it 
may appear to be particularly hard to satisfy both of these conditions in certain cases, the range of 
targeting methods is wide enough to adjust to the demands of the situation. 
3 A wide range of targeting methods 
There is a wide range of targeting methods available, which can be grouped into two main categories. 
First, there are the selective targeting methods, i.e. the methods that define an eligibility criterion to 
target the population. Second, there are the non-selective methods covering the different types of self-
                                                 
12 There are many examples illustrating the risky, if not explosive nature of such a reform. In the 1980s and early 
1990s, the reform of universal food aid programmes sparked riots in Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, the Dominican 
Republic, Sudan and Jordan. 
13 The cut in the programme budget due to poor political support can be said to be a cost. 
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targeting. The choice between these two main categories assumes a different overall policy concept 
since not all policies can be self-targeting. 
 
Among the selective targeting methods, the discriminating criterion is “target size”. In one case, the 
aim is to target individuals or households. In the other, the aim is to target an entire category of the 
population. The general targeting principle for individuals and households is that officially appointed 
programme representatives check, individual by individual or household by household, whether the 
applicant is eligible for the programme on the basis of a criterion defined upstream. Categorical 
targeting consists of making all individuals eligible in a given population category. The only eligibility 
criterion is therefore whether or not the applicant belongs to this category. The underlying assumption 
is that membership of the chosen category is closely correlated with being poor. The category is often 
defined by area of residence, gender, age, ethnic group, disability or unemployment. The purpose of 
this section is to present each of these three kinds of targeting with their own particularities. 
3.1 Targeting poor individuals or households 
The most intuitive method for focusing a programme’s resources on the poor is to define an eligibility 
criterion and select the households or individuals that meet this criterion. The eligibility criterion 
needs to measure the poverty status of the households or individuals. 
The eligibility criterion can be defined using a direct measurement of income or consumption. This 
targeting method, known as means testing, can only be used for programmes that aim to reduce 
monetary poverty. It is by far the most expensive method, but boasts the lowest inclusion and 
exclusion error levels when it is conducted properly. 
The eligibility criterion may also be based on a score built from a set of variables reflecting the 
households’ living conditions. This method is known as proxy means testing, alluding to the fact that 
the indicator is an approximation of a direct measurement of income or consumption. It can also be 
seen as an indicator that measures non-monetary poverty, in particular the non-satisfaction of basic 
needs. If the aim is to measure monetary poverty, this method is cheaper and easier to implement than 
the first, but it is also less accurate. 
3.1.1 Means testing 
 
Means testing identifies the poor on the basis of a monetary criterion. The standard of living of each 
household or individual in the programme’s potential beneficiary population is measured. Only those 
individuals or households with a standard of living below a given threshold then benefit from the 
programme. This type of targeting is used mostly for cash transfer policies. 
 
The potential beneficiaries’ standard of living can be estimated from their income or consumption. 
The choice of one or the other indicator depends on a number of considerations, namely the 
programme’s poverty reduction goals and the quality of the available data. If the programme’s main 
aim is to reach the chronic poor, the most suitable indicator for measuring a household’s standard of 
living is the amount of consumption spending. As shown by Deaton (1992), household consumption is 
indeed the best indicator of a household’s permanent income. It is less sensitive to seasonal variations 
than household income. Moreover, measuring consumption often produces higher quality results than 
measuring income.14 However, if the programme’s aim is to reach transient poor households, income 
can be a more suitable measurement15 since it is a less smoothed measurement of welfare than 
consumption and, consequently, better reflects the shocks suffered by the households. 
 
                                                 
14 Households are often less reluctant to detail their expenditure than to state their level of income. In addition, 
measuring earned income is a tricky and often inaccurate exercise in developing countries where a large part of 
the economy is informal. This is especially true of agricultural earnings. 
15 When no cross-cutting data are available. 
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Information on the income or consumption of potential beneficiaries can be collected by a quasi-
exhaustive survey or by on-demand applications. The choice between these two collection processes is 
made by a trade-off between keeping down the costs of data collection and minimising targeting 
exclusion errors. Collection using a quasi-exhaustive survey is more apt to minimise exclusion errors, 
but is also the most expensive method. 
 
In practice, the effectiveness of means testing is highly dependent on the mechanisms used to check 
the quality of the potential beneficiaries’ statements. The more meticulous the check, the lower the 
risks of understated means. Ideally, this information would be crosschecked with other data sources 
such as tax, employer and social security databases, which implies a highly developed administrative 
system in the country concerned. This type of check is generally impracticable in developing 
countries. 
 
Another way of checking on statements is to visit the household to check in a qualitative way that 
visible standards of living are more or less consistent with the figures reported. This method was used, 
for example, for the Jamaican food stamp programme and the Mexican subsidised milk programme 
(Grosh, 1994). This method of checking also reduces inclusion and exclusion errors, but it is very 
expensive. 
 
A final way of checking is to ask the potential beneficiaries to provide proof of their statements. This 
system with its lower administrative costs can be put in place more quickly and is less demanding of 
administrative capacities. However, the cost of checking falls largely on the households’ shoulders as 
they are the ones who pay the cost of supplying the substantiating documents. The example of the 
targeted child support grant programme in South Africa (Rosa et al., 2005) provides a good illustration 
of the programme’s private cost. Applicants for the programme had to provide supporting documents 
such as their marriage certificate, a payslip for those employed and otherwise an official statement 
from the person supporting the family. In a country where employment certificates are rare due to the 
high level of labour market informality and where marriages are seldom registered at a registry office, 
especially in rural areas, it is clearly extremely expensive for households to obtain all the documents 
required, especially the poorest households often the most remote from the administrative system. The 
direct upshot of this was the exclusion of the poorest from the programme. It also emerged that the 
supporting documents required varied a great deal depending on the regional offices in charge. This 
raised the question of equity in the treatment of applicants. 
 
So means testing is no doubt the targeting method most apt to minimise inclusion and exclusion errors, 
provided that the mechanisms set up to check the information are effective. Yet it does have the 
drawback of encouraging households to reduce their income to benefit from the programme, for 
example by working less. It is also the most expensive method by far. The cost is borne by the central 
administration if the means testing is based on crosschecks of databases or household visits. It is borne 
by the households if it is up to them to prove their means statements. In this latter case, there is a high 
risk of excluding the poorest and lowering net programme benefits for the poor. 
3.1.2 Proxy-means testing 
Many programmes have sought to target poor households or individuals using an alternative 
methodology to circumvent the burden and cost of collecting means testing information or in the 
interests of a broader approach to poverty. This alternative methodology is proxy-means testing. 
Originally established in the Latin American countries, this type of targeting has been used in most of 
the world’s regions for a whole host of different programmes (food stamps, conditional transfers, 
public employment programmes, vocational training grants, etc.). 
 
The principle of proxy-means testing is to generate a score by adding up and weighting a small 
number of variables that meet three main criteria: 
- They are closely correlated in terms of household or individual poverty, 
- They can be easily measured or observed, 
- They are hard for the households or individuals to manipulate. 
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These variables generally concern housing quality and occupancy status, ownership of durable goods, 
the household’s demographic structure, labour force status, activity sector, and the level of education 
of the members of the household. The number of variables has to remain small for proxy-means 
testing to maintain its comparative advantage in terms of collection cost and for the programme 
allocation process to remain relatively transparent. 
 
When poverty is defined in monetary terms, the variables used for the indicator are generally chosen 
from an already available household survey including a measurement of the income or consumption of 
the individuals or households. The income or consumption is then estimated from the chosen 
explanatory variables. The coefficients obtained from the estimation are used to assign a weight to 
each of the variables. This regression can be made for each region or administrative division or by 
urban/rural area to account for regional disparities in a given country. In this event, the weight vector 
varies depending on the different geographical units. 
When the chosen approach to poverty is not monetary, the variables are weighted according to the 
programme’s stated priorities. 
 
A lightweight survey is then conducted of all the individuals or households that are potential 
beneficiaries of the programme. Its questionnaire is restricted to collecting information on the 
variables identified in the previous stage. As with means testing, this collection stage is decisive for 
the efficiency and cost of the targeting. The survey is used to assign each programme applicant a score 
corresponding to the sum of the variables observed weighted by the coefficients obtained from the 
estimation or set by the programme. Each household’s eligibility depends on the value of this score 
compared with a score set as the poverty line. 
 
Where the objective is to reduce monetary poverty, proxy-means testing is less effective than means 
testing in that the standard of living is not directly observed, but approximated by a set of variables 
more or less correlated with the standard of living (Skoufias and Coady, 2007). However, it does have 
a number of advantages. The first is its lower cost. Secondly, it is relatively less demanding of 
administrative system capacities. However, it does call for personnel trained to calculate the scores of 
the households or individuals, either nationally or locally depending on the data collection process set 
up. Proxy-means testing also boasts the advantage of limiting the incentives for households to change 
their behaviour, since they do not necessarily make a clear connection between the information they 
are asked to provide and the score that will determine whether or not they are entitled to benefit from 
the programme.  On the downside, however, this type of targeting has a higher social cost precisely 
because the population often has a flawed understanding of the system used to build the indicator. One 
last advantage of proxy-means testing is that it reduces the risks of corruption or diversion of the 
programme for political ends because the criterion is extremely rigid. This rigidity can result in a more 
level playing field for the potential beneficiaries since the targeting criterion is the same for everyone: 
households with the same (observable) characteristics will be treated in the same way. 
 
However, the score is put together from variables that do not change very much, even in the event of a 
huge change in the household’s standard of living. In addition, it does not do such a good job of 
reflecting the situation of households at either end of the distribution. Proxy-means testing is therefore 
suited to a policy that aims to break chronically poor households out of poverty, but is not suitable for 
programmes designed to play a safety net role (Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott, 2004a). 
3.2 Categorical targeting 
 
Rather than targeting individuals or households, many poverty reduction programmes have opted for 
broader targeting, i.e. choosing to target a population of categories of individuals. The categories most 
frequently defined by the programmes using this type of targeting are area of residence – called 
geographic targeting – and demographic characteristics such as age and gender. 
 
This type of targeting is particularly well suited to countries in which a particular category of the 
population is harder hit by poverty than the others. It saves having to identify the poor household by 
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household or individual by individual. This keeps down the administrative and private costs of 
targeting, but also the social costs since there is not so much stigma attached to this type of targeted 
programme. Targeting by categories also takes into account the non-monetary aspects of poverty, in 
the same way as proxy-means testing, and reduces unfair inequalities based, for example, on gender or 
place of birth. However, targeting by categories is only efficient on two conditions: 
- The targeted category must be poorer on the whole than the other categories; 
- The individuals or households in the category must be relatively homogeneous in terms of 
their poverty status. 
Its efficiency is also highly dependent on the quality of the available data.    
3.2.1 Geographic targeting 
 
In most developing countries, poverty is concentrated in certain geographic areas, also called “pockets 
of poverty” (Bigman and Fofack, 2000). There are many reasons for regional disparities. At a detailed 
geographic level, such as the village, households generally share the same climatic and geographical 
conditions, the same type of productive activities and the same infrastructure access. Income 
inequalities can therefore be greater between villages than among individuals in the same village. For 
example, Ravallion and Wodon (1997) show that the place of residence in Bangladesh is a better 
predictor of poverty level than all the other household characteristics. They conclude that poor areas 
are not just poor because households with observable attributes correlated with poverty are 
geographically concentrated, but rather because of differences in returns to given household 
characteristics (their labour force, their human capital, etc.) depending on the geographic area. 
 
This observation has prompted many policymakers and poverty alleviation programme administrators 
to choose programme beneficiaries by the geographic area in which they live, differentiating between 
poor areas and non-poor areas. 
 
So the efficiency of geographic targeting depends to a large extent on the concentration of poor 
individuals within the geographic areas. If the population has fairly heterogeneous poverty levels 
within the areas, targeting generates both inclusion errors (the areas identified as poor contain a large 
proportion of non-poor) and exclusion errors (poor individuals live in areas defined as non-poor). This 
example of the inefficiency of geographic targeting is illustrated by Simler and Nhate (2005) in 
Mozambique. The authors find very low concentrations of poverty within the geographic areas, even 
when these areas are defined at a highly detailed level. A mere 20% of consumption inequalities 
observed can be accounted for by differences between districts or between the smaller administrative 
posts. This means that 80% of the inequalities are due to differences within geographic areas, with the 
poor living alongside the non-poor. So geographic targeting is unsuitable in countries such as 
Mozambique. 
 
In general, the more detailed the geographic breakdown, the greater the chances of the population 
displaying homogeneous poverty characteristics within the area, as shown by Backer and Grosh 
(1994) in the case of Venezuela, Mexico and Jamaica. However, the level of geographic breakdown 
depends on the data available. 
 
If the only recent data available come from household surveys, the poverty indicator is calculated at a 
necessarily broad geographic level, that for which the survey remains representative. Ravallion (1993) 
evaluates the effect of geographic targeting in Indonesia where poor areas are identified from a 
household survey representative at province level. He shows that there are poverty reduction gains to 
be had with this type of targeting, but that they are small compared with a non-targeted policy. 
 
Another possibility is to use nationwide administrative data containing information assumed to be 
correlated with the geographic area’s poverty level. The geographic breakdown in this case is highly 
detailed, but the information available sometimes has little to do with poverty, especially monetary 
poverty (Hentschel et al., 1998). This information may concern levels of education, infrastructure 
endowments (roads, water supply, healthcare infrastructures, school supply, etc.) or the satisfaction of 
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basic needs. In Honduras, for example, the PRAF transfer programme chose level of nutrition in each 
municipality16 as its criterion for the selection of eligible municipalities. In its early days, the 
PROGRESA programme used census data to build a local poverty indicator, including such variables 
as the over-15 illiteracy rate; the percentage of households without access to running water, drainage 
or electricity; the average number of occupants per room; and the percentage of houses with earth 
floors (Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott, 2004a). 
 
When both a recent census and household surveys are available for the country, a detailed geographic 
breakdown can be combined with a precise definition of poverty. The combination of these two data 
sources overcomes the limitations they present when taken separately: the poor representativeness of 
the surveys at a detailed geographic level and inadequate census information for the calculation of a 
poverty indicator. Geographic targeting then uses the methodology developed to draw up poverty 
maps. This methodology targets the poor defined by a monetary criterion. The household survey is 
used to estimate a level of consumption based on variables found in both the survey and the census.17 
The model obtained from this estimation is subsequently used to estimate a level of consumption for 
all the households from the census data, using the same variables as those contained in the survey. 
Poverty can then be evaluated at the level of the smallest geographic unit contained in the census. In 
recent years, developing countries have widely developed this tool to implement their social policies. 
Elbers et al. (2004) list over 30 developing countries with this instrument. 
 
Many consider that this geographic targeting method outdoes the others. However, it does suffer from 
some serious shortcomings due to the constraints of the data, namely the small number of variables 
shared by the consumption survey and the census and the fact that these common variables are often 
not very comparable because they are worded differently in the two data sources. Hentschel et al. 
(1998), in their pioneering study on Ecuador, ultimately manage to rank very few provinces by 
poverty level since the poverty rates estimated by this methodology are generally not significantly 
different from one province to the next. Similarly, Schady (2002) compares this method in Peru with 
other less sophisticated types of geographic targeting: targeting based on infant mortality rates, on the 
chronic malnutrition rate, and on a composite indicator.18 He finds no significant difference in the 
results obtained using the different geographic targeting indicators. The methodology of combining 
census and household survey data does not outclass the others. 
 
Some authors have taken advantage of technological advances in geographic information systems 
(GIS) to improve the predictive capacities of poverty map targeting by supplementing census and 
household survey data with geo-referenced data. Bigman et al. (1998) take this approach in a study on 
Burkina Faso. The authors overcome the limitations of the information contained in the population 
census by drawing on a large number of information sources in addition to the census: different 
household surveys, a community-level database on public infrastructures (roads, water supply, etc.), 
and department-level data on agro-climatic conditions. Each piece of information is mapped by a 
geographic information system (GIS). All the data are integrated by means of their geographic 
coordinates into the household surveys for which consumption information is available. The level of 
consumption is then estimated using the variables that best explain consumption and area available for 
all the communities. Here again, the model’s parameters dictate the weights to be assigned to each 
variable available for all the geographic coordinates present in the census. In this way, the authors 
predict poverty indicators for 3,871 rural and urban communities and show that community-level 
targeting conducted in this manner sharply reduces inclusion and exclusion errors compared with 
regional targeting. 
                                                 
16 This level was defined following a 1997 census of all children in the first year of school during which children 
were weighed and measured. 
17 Data on education, the household’s demographic structure, sometimes the household members’ work, and the 
quality of housing. 
18 This indicator is the weighted sum of the rates of chronic malnutrition, illiteracy, school-age children not in 
school, overcrowded housing, inadequate roofing, and the proportion of the population without access to water, 
sewerage and electricity. 
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So in the case where there is support for the spatial concentration of poverty hypothesis and where the 
available data are of good quality, geographic targeting is definitely a preferable targeting method to 
individual or household targeting. It costs much less because the beneficiaries are defined from 
already existing data. Grosh finds that the cost of geographic targeting for 30 targeted programmes in 
Latin America is, on average, three times lower than the cost of individual targeting. 
 
This type of targeting also has a limited effect on household behaviour in that it is expensive to change 
place of residence just to be eligible for the programme. In addition, there is little stigma attached to it 
for the households or individuals.19 
 
However, the political cost of including or excluding certain geographic areas can be high, since the 
excluded geographic areas could feel strongly that the system is unfair. If, for example, as in the 
Bolivian case, the beneficiary geographic areas are concentrated in just a few departments, the other 
departments will bring political pressure to bear that could put an end to the programme (Grosh, 
1994). However, Bigman and Fofack (2000) posit that when geographic targeting is conducted at a 
detailed enough level (village or urban community), it can reduce ethnic and political tensions due to 
the dispersal of the programme’s beneficiary villages among wider geographic areas that are more 
homogeneous in ethnic and political terms. 
 
3.2.2 Demographic targeting 
 
Demographic targeting defines programme beneficiaries on the basis of all the people who correspond 
to an easily observable demographic group such as women or the elderly. The underlying assumption 
in this type of targeting is that certain demographic groups are harder hit by poverty than others, due 
either to their vulnerability or discrimination against them. Another objective of demographic 
targeting is, in some cases, to use the positive externalities generated by the fact that a certain category 
of the population benefits from the programme. Duflo (2000) shows, for example, that when the 
beneficiary of a transfer programme for pensioners in South Africa is a woman, the development of 
the household’s granddaughters (measured by the size-to-age ratio) significantly improves. 
 
The first step in this type of targeting is to make sure, upstream, that the targeted group really is poorer 
than the others. This can be complicated when the poverty indicator used is consumption since 
estimating the chosen group’s poverty level is often sensitive to the choice of equivalence scales.20 
Lanjouw et al. (1998) illustrate this issue in seven Eastern European and former USSR countries. 
Without an equivalence scale, the elderly are less poor on average than the rest of the population and 
the households with at least three children are poorer on average. The results are reversed when the 
children are assigned a weight of 0.7 to 0.9, i.e. the adults are assumed to have greater needs than the 
children. This then justifies targeting elderly persons rather than families with a lot of children. 
 
This type of targeting is generally used to meet specific poverty reduction goals, but above all for its 
relative ease of implementation and its low cost compared with the other types of targeting. Like 
geographic targeting, it does not stigmatise the poor population and avoids behavioural changes by 
individuals. And it has the added advantage of often being popular and therefore enjoying broad-based 
public support. 
 
                                                 
19 However, at detailed levels, geographic targeting of disadvantaged areas could have a stigma attached to it. 
20 Household consumption is provided by the surveys. A household’s consumption cannot be divided by the 
number of its members to find one household member’s consumption (young child, elderly member, head of 
household or pregnant woman) since the household’s members have different needs in view of their age and 
work, and economies of scale exist within the household. Hence the use of an equivalence scale, which assigns 
different weights to each household member. The verdict regarding the demographic group considered can 
change immensely depending on the weights used. 
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Nevertheless, it can prove more complicated to implement for certain demographic groups. Age 
targeting requires potential beneficiaries to produce documentary proof of their age and these papers 
can be hard to come by, especially for the elderly. In addition, the youngest and the oldest are the least 
mobile. This potentially restricts their applications to participate in the programme and therefore the 
targeting’s coverage. Pregnant women targeting requires the women to provide a certificate of 
pregnancy, which is expensive to get hold of since they have to go to a health centre for one. 
 
Demographic targeting can therefore be an effective way of targeting the poor, provided that the 
chosen group is relevant and the programme application procedures do not represent too high a private 
cost, which would exclude part of the targeted population. Bear in mind that exclusion errors, in 
addition to reducing the programme’s poverty alleviation impact, give rise to horizontal inequity by 
discriminating among the poor – poor beneficiaries and poor non-beneficiaries – which can in turn 
prompt a feeling of injustice. 
3.3 Self-targeting 
Self-targeting does not impose eligibility conditions. The method is based on incentives that encourage 
participation by the poor and/or discourage participation by the non-poor. These incentives make use 
of opportunity cost differences between the poor and the non-poor. The allocation mechanisms make 
the implicit cost of participating in the programme proportional to the participants’ level of income or 
wealth. A number of benefit or transfer allocation mechanisms are commonly used: workfare, goods 
quality differentiation and distribution conditions, and targeting by quantities consumed. 
 
One of the main advantages of self-targeting is that it saves on beneficiary selection costs. It is a 
relatively long-standing and widespread targeting method, especially in countries with weak 
administrative capacities. It often links an incentive mechanism with a particular type of intervention. 
Workfare goes hand in hand with the provision of public works. Food subsidies make use of goods 
quality differentiation and/or distribution method. Quantity targeting concerns mainly the distribution 
of services such as water and electricity at highly subsidised rates. 
 
The efficiency of self-targeted programmes depends on the validity of the hypothesis on which the 
self-targeting mechanism is based. We will look in turn at three different incentive mechanisms: work, 
quality and quantity. 
3.3.1 Self-targeted workfare 
 
Self-targeted workfare in the form of public works programmes aims to reach the poorest members of 
the community and contribute to national development projects. This type of system is more 
widespread in rural areas. The public works programmes generally use unskilled or low-skilled 
manpower for construction projects such as building roads, schools and drainage channels, 
reforestation and land reclamation. The self-targeting is based on the fact that the wages paid in return 
for the work are low enough to encourage participation solely by individuals without or unable to find 
more well-paid jobs. 
 
This type of programme is often presented as a safety net system: universal accessibility and the 
transient nature of the work mean that individuals can turn to the programme if they need to. 
Nevertheless, this insurance property relies on two vital characteristics: the availability of the 
mechanism at all times to cover individual risks and its capacity for rapid deployment if necessary to 
cover collective risks. This safety net aspect can be illustrated by the Maharashta Employment 
Guarantee Scheme (MEGS) in operation in the Indian State of Maharashtra since 1965. Under this 
programme, each participant is guaranteed a minimum-wage job within a 5 km radius of his or her 
home (Datt and Ravallion, 1994). 
 
Among the programmes using work as a beneficiary selection mechanism, the food-for-work (FFW) 
programmes are particularly widespread. Food represents all or part of the wage paid to workers on 
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these programmes. Although the food-for-work programmes distribute food, they rarely include 
explicit nutritional objectives in their main goals and are seen mainly as programmes for employment 
generating earnings distributed in kind. 
 
As with other self-targeting programmes, the beneficiaries’ selection costs are theoretically zero 
because accessibility is universal. The implementation costs, however, are high as managing public 
works is a relatively technical and complex task. The private participation costs are also potentially 
high. The value of the transfer made by these programmes corresponds to the value of the wage 
distributed minus the direct participation costs (transport) and earnings from alternative work. This 
latter cost element can represent a not-inconsiderable share of the costs borne by the individuals. In the 
case of the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme (MEGS), Datt and Ravallion find that loss of 
earnings from alternative activities varies enormously depending on the circumstances and can 
represent over 25% of the wage paid by the programme. 
 
Evaluations of the effectiveness of self-targeted workfare programmes have shown that even though 
these programmes often reach their targets (relatively small exclusion error), many non-poor 
individuals also take part (large inclusion error) (Barrett, 2002). The usual explanation is that the wage 
rates are generally set too high. The work provided by these programmes hence replaces the work that 
would have been offered on the local market, thereby limiting the additionality of the transfers made. 
Moreover, when wages are too high, programme administrators can find themselves faced with a 
surplus labour supply and have to ration participation. In the presence of rationing, the probability of 
participation generally increases with social standing and the poor can hence be excluded from the 
programme. 
 
More structural causes such as labour, land and credit market imperfections can also introduce 
distortions that make the public works programme incentives counteract the aim of the targeting. 
 
This problem is illustrated in a study by Barrett and Clay (2003), who examine the effectiveness of a 
FFW programme in Ethiopia. They use a data set to establish that participation is extremely sensitive 
to the wage level offered (high wage elasticity of labour supply), but also that individuals’ propensity 
to participate in the programme varies little with income level (low income elasticity of labour 
supply). These two characteristics suggest that the trade-off between exclusion and inclusion errors is 
very tricky. If wage levels are too low, very few poor people take part in the programme (exclusion 
error). At higher wage levels, a very large proportion of non-poor want to participate (inclusion error). 
For example, households with incomes at double the median income have a tendency to participate 
that is never below 80% of the probability for households in the poorest decile. 
 
The self-targeting property of FFW programmes is based on the idea that the households with the most 
productive assets (land and livestock) have a high marginal labour productivity and, consequently, 
higher shadow wages than the households less well endowed with physical capital.21 However, Barrett 
and Clay (2003) show that imperfect labour and land markets prevent the equalisation of factor ratios 
(workers/hectare) across farms of different sizes. So a relatively poor household with little land and 
even less work can have a higher shadow wage than a better-off household with more land and 
proportionally more work. This gives rise to a huge amount of variability in marginal productivity (i.e. 
shadow wages) and a relative decorrelation between the household’s shadow wage and income. This 
decorrelation explains the low income elasticity of the labour supply of rural Ethiopian households and 
the problems involved in making a trade-off between exclusion errors and inclusion errors. Studies of 
self-targeted transfer schemes with a work condition show that the effectiveness and equity of these 
programmes depend on the characteristics of both the programme and the local labour market. More 
specifically, the most decisive programme elements are the wage offered and incorporation of the 
seasonal nature of farming in rural areas. As regards the local labour market characteristics, the wage 
and income elasticities of the individuals’ labour supply explain not only the exclusion and inclusion 
                                                 
21 The same reasoning can be applied to human capital endowments. 
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errors, but also the magnitude of the private participation costs due to the loss of income from 
alternative activities. 
 
Other problems specific to public works programmes are liable to occur (FAO, 2003). In many cases, 
the infrastructure and other facilities built by these schemes are not properly maintained. Public works 
programmes can trigger population movements and put strong pressure on social infrastructures and 
the environment in areas where the programme is being conducted. The schemes do not necessarily 
improve the nutritional condition of the family members the most at risk of malnutrition. This 
shortcoming is due to the fact that certain household members cannot participate in the programme 
(children, the elderly and the invalid) and that participating individuals’ transfers are not proportional 
to the size of their household. 
3.3.2 Self-targeting by quality differentiation and time costs 
 
Self-targeting by quality differentiation and time costs is commonly used for food distribution and the 
distribution of basic social services (healthcare and education). Targeting by quality differentiation is 
based on the assumption that there are different types of goods: “inferior” goods – goods for which 
demand decreases when income increases – and “normal” or “superior” goods – for which demand 
increases when income increases. Applying public subsidies to inferior goods provides a transfer to 
poor households without any beneficiary household selection required. 
 
In the case of the food distribution programmes, the inferior nature of the subsidised goods is 
generally associated with non-nutritional qualities such as taste, preparation and presentation. For 
example, in Thailand in the 1970s, subsidised rice was distributed consisting of 25% sticky rice and 
75% ordinary rice, a mixture that was less preferable to consumers (Lorge, Rogers and Coates, 2002). 
In the United States, products distributed by food stamp programmes are identical to commercial 
products, but identified differently by their labels, which makes them less desirable. In many North 
African and Middle Eastern countries, targeting by quality differentiation has gradually been 
introduced into existing subsidised food distribution programmes in order to reduce the costs of these 
programmes which, in the case of Iran, were absorbing resources equal to nearly 6% of GDP (FAO, 
2003). Targeting was based mainly on distributed product differentiation, with a larger subsidy 
attached to the lower quality products. 
 
Benefits may also be targeted by means of the time costs involved or social stigmatisation. In the first 
case, the underlying assumption is that the opportunity cost of the time taken is proportional to the 
individual’s wealth. This hypothesis is similar to the assumption in programmes using workfare 
targeting. In the second case, self-targeting is based on the assumption that individuals set greater store 
by their social status (affected by stigmatisation) when their income is high. This applies, for example, 
to public standpipes to supply water in urban areas. The time cost, transport effort and stigma attached 
to these standpipes makes them unappealing to the non-poor, who prefer to use private networks. Self-
targeting can also be based on a distribution of food products by public health centres or state schools 
in countries where the better-off use private health establishments and private schools. 
 
In this type of programme, the more valid the assumptions about the inferior or superior nature of the 
goods distributed, the lower the inclusion and exclusion risks. For example, if the stigmatisation on 
which the self-targeting mechanism is based is too costly socially speaking, the poor will refuse to 
participate in the programme. Stigmatisation can also erode the programme’s impact on poverty in that 
it undermines self-esteem, defined by Rawls (1971) as a primary good. It therefore risks hampering 
the poor’s capacities to acquire skills and break out of poverty (Besley and Kanbur, 1993). 
 
The risk of non-participation by the poor also applies to programmes based on targeting by product 
quality differentiation. In the case of Tunisia, the introduction of less refined and highly subsidised 
brown sugar was a flop because the majority of consumers, including the poor, considered the darker 
sugar to be “dirty”. Excessive time costs can also curb potential participation by poor households. 
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3.3.3 Quantity targeting 
 
Self-targeting based on quantities consumed is a highly specific targeting method concerning 
essentially the distribution of water and electricity services. Supply subsidies are effectively a social 
policy instrument that can be used in poverty alleviation strategies, as in Honduras and Sri Lanka 
(Komives et al., 2007). They serve to raise households’ income, but also to make these services 
accessible to the poor. Komives et al. (2005) conduct an analysis of water services in 80 cities and 
electricity services in 50 countries worldwide. They estimate the prevalence of subsidised water and 
electricity rates at 80% and 70% respectively. 
 
Quantity targeting uses increasing block tariff structures. The principle of increasing block tariffs 
(IBTs) is to supply a first highly subsidised block (theoretically corresponding to a “subsistence” 
quantity in the case of water), with the unit price rising with each successive block. Based on the 
assumption that poor households consume less water and electricity than the rich, this tariff structure 
enables the poor to pay a lower average cost. 
 
Selection is therefore by consumption level, with the households able to “choose” their consumption 
block. Yet this choice is constrained by the number of people in the household – because the blocks 
generally apply to one connection without taking account of family size – and by the fact that 
connections are shared by a number of households in many countries without this being a formal 
arrangement. Consequently, the larger poor households that more frequently share a connection reach 
the unsubsidised consumption levels more quickly. However, the prerequisite for eligibility for these 
subsidies is connection to the water network or electricity grid, even though inequalities of access 
remain very strong in the developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
The progressivity of the tariff, and the targeting performance of the resulting subsidies, will also 
depend on the extent of service consumption differences by standard of living. If a steep gradient is 
not applied, it will be hard to limit the inclusion errors where a large subsidised volume is concerned, 
or this would occur at the expense of a sharp rise in exclusion errors. 
 
The costs induced by this type of targeting are associated here with the transparency and clarity of the 
tariff structures. Some tariffs comprise a large number of blocks, which are not always the same for 
water and sanitation. The households’ capacity to anticipate total consumption is also associated with 
billing frequency. Consumption control mechanisms, such as filling up the tank with a set volume of 
water and prepayment meters, could make it easier for households to control their consumption, but 
they are still thin on the ground. 
4 What lessons can be drawn from the poverty reduction policy targeting 
experiences? 
This section presents an analysis of the different lessons that can be drawn from the poverty reduction 
policy targeting experiences. It first looks at measuring the efficiency of targeting and its link with the 
impact of policies on poverty. Then it asks who the targeting players should be before summing up the 
pros and cons of the different targeting methods. 
4.1 The efficiency of targeting and its impact on poverty 
A number of authors have defined targeting efficiency indicators with a view to identifying best 
targeting practices. Efficiency here is defined as the capacity of the targeting to minimise both 
inclusion errors and exclusion errors. The indicator defined by Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2004a, 
2004b) is probably the most commonly used in the empirical literature. It consists of the normalised 
share of transfers received by the poorest p%, i.e. the share of transfers going to the poorest p% 
compared with the percentage they represent of the total population. These authors posit that this 
indicator can be interpreted as the ratio of the observed targeting outcome to the outcome of a 
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universal transfer with the same budget.22 A value higher than 1 means that the poor receive more 
transfers through the targeted policy than through the universal transfer. The allocation is said to be 
“progressive”. A value of less than 1 corresponds to a “regressive” allocation: the poor receive less in 
the way of transfers than they would have done if the same programme had not been targeted. 
 
Like most of the targeting efficiency indicators built by weighting inclusion and exclusion errors in 
various ways, this indicator has its limits.23 As pointed out by Ravallion (2007), it overevaluates the 
inclusion errors at the expense of the exclusion errors.  Consequently, the evaluation of targeting 
performance attributes a greater weight to the capacity to keep spending down – by preventing the 
non-poor from benefiting from the programme – than to the capacity to reach all the poor targeted by 
the programme. 
 
Secondly, this indicator does not evaluate the effect of targeting on the distribution of welfare among 
the poor or, more generally, on the entire population’s welfare distribution. If vertical equity is to be 
achieved, when choosing between two programmes with the same proportion of inclusion and 
exclusion errors, it is preferable to opt for the programme that reaches the poorest of the poor rather 
than that which reaches the least poor of the poor. Likewise, a programme that includes non-poor 
bordering on the poverty line is preferable over a programme that includes non-poor at the tail end of 
the distribution curve. Moreover, for the sake of horizontal equity, it is advisable to treat all the poor 
with the same level of welfare exactly the same. 
 
Lastly, this indicator appears to be weakly correlated with the impact of poverty reduction 
programmes. Ravallion (2007) seeks to evaluate, in the specific case of the Chinese Di Bao 
programme, the extent to which the targeting efficiency indicators are correlated with the 
programme’s impact on monetary poverty. This programme pays urban households below a certain 
poverty line a cash allocation to help them break out of poverty. Ravallion draws on the fact that the 
programme was set up independently in each municipality, giving the municipal authorities a great 
deal of power over the definition of the poverty line for their town, the total sum of transfers and the 
implementation of the programme itself. He calculates a number of targeting efficiency indicators for 
the 35 major municipalities of China. In addition, he estimates the poverty impact that can be 
attributed to the programme by means of the variation in the number of poor before and after the 
programme’s introduction. His findings suggest that there is no significant correlation between 
poverty reduction and the indicators most often used in the literature. Nevertheless, Ravallion shows 
that the more successful the towns at containing inclusion errors, the less successful they are at 
reducing poverty. Conversely, the lower the level of exclusion errors, the more the programme 
significantly reduces poverty. So it would seem that the weak capacity of the most frequently used 
indicators to reflect the impact of targeting on poverty reduction is due to their very weak correlation 
with the programme’s coverage of the poor (if not even a negative correlation in certain cases).  
 
The weak link between targeting efficiency as measured by the indicators used in the literature and the 
programme’s impact on poverty suggests it would be advisable to opt for a targeting evaluation 
approach directly associated with the impact of targeting on poverty reduction. This recommendation 
was made by Cornia and Stewart back in 1995. It is also the message with which Ravallion concludes 
(2007, p. 19): “If there is a single message from this study it is that analysts and policy makers would 
be better advised to focus on the estimable outcome measures most directly relevant to their policy 
problem. In the present context, impacts on poverty can be assessed with the same data and under the 
same assumptions as required by prevailing measures of targeting performance.” 
 
The idea of this approach is to measure a programme’s targeting performances by comparing its 
poverty reduction impact with that of a counterfactual, i.e. a programme with the same budget, but 
different targeting. Many studies compare ex ante the poverty impacts of different programme 
implementation methods for a given country in order to guide decision-makers upstream or help them 
                                                 
22 This interpretation is disputed by Ravallion (2007). 
23 For a more detailed presentation of the targeting efficiency indicators, see Lavallée et al., 2009, p. 47. 
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revise the targeting methods for existing programmes. However, it is not so easy for this approach to 
compare programmes conducted in unrelated contexts with different budgets. 
   
4.2 Who should do the targeting? 
One of the main problems with targeting is obtaining information on the poor’s living conditions and 
needs. A method often proposed to overcome this problem is to decentralise the evaluation of 
household living standards and the selection of welfare programme recipients to local organisations. 
The main argument in support of this decentralisation process is that local organisations (non-
governmental organisations, local government and local communities) have more access to the 
information required (Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott, 2004a; Conning and Kevane, 2002). In other 
words, it is easier and cheaper for them to obtain information on household living conditions than it is 
for the central administration. They are held to be better informed about the members of their 
community and better placed to recognise the “real” poor. For their part, the households are said to 
find it harder and be less inclined to hide their real standards of living from the local authorities. This 
grassroots access to information is put forward as grounds for the decentralisation of the targeting 
process on the basis that it substantially improves targeting performance by reducing inclusion and 
exclusion errors along with the costs of identifying and monitoring the poor.24 
 
In a study on the Albanian Ndihme Ekonomika (NE) social assistance programme, Alderman (2002) 
shows that communities use locally available information to allocate welfare benefits. In this 
programme, decisions regarding beneficiary selection and the amount of benefits allocated to each 
household are decentralised to commune level. The households first of all apply for the programme. 
Then an administrator selects the households and determines the amount to be allocated to each 
household on the basis of its size, land assets, and the wages and pensions it receives. Lastly, an 
elected committee makes the final welfare allocation decisions. It not only has the power to add or 
eliminate beneficiaries, but it makes the actual decision on the amount allocated to each household. It 
is at this stage that the information available to the committee members comes into play. Alderman 
shows that criteria other than household size, assets and income are taken into account to allocate 
benefits and better target the poor. Such factors are hard for a household survey to grasp and have 
nothing to do with labour market participation or assets. For example, the committee members may be 
aware that a given household has resources (such as savings abroad) that it was not bound to declare to 
participate in the programme. Or it may know that certain households have fallen on hard times due to 
the loss of part of their harvest, for example, which their land ownership cannot possibly reflect. 
 
However, the main worry about decentralisation is that communities might divert the resources 
intended for the poor. There is nothing to say that they will actually handle vulnerable groups in a 
suitable manner. Their main concern is not necessarily the success of the programme. For example, a 
mayor or local politician’s priority could well be to be re-elected, a teacher’s might be the quality of 
his relationship with his pupils, and so on. 
 
Many studies have shown that the risk of capture by local elites grows with inequalities. For example, 
in a study of a decentralised food-for-education programme in Bangladesh, Galasso and Ravallion 
(2005) find that the villages with the highest land inequalities are the worst at targeting the poor. 
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) analyse decentralised programmes conducted in the State of West 
Bengal in India over the 1978-1998 period. Their study finds that land inequalities reduce performance 
in terms of targeting agricultural input credit and distribution programmes (seeds, fertiliser and 
pesticides). They also show that local government in areas with the highest inequalities tends to 
choose less efficient public employment programmes in terms of job creations. Araujo et al. (2008) 
draw on data on social fund investments in Ecuador to show that, where inequalities are high, the 
communities’ choices give rise to projects benefiting the entire community rather than projects 
targeting the poorer individuals. They observe that the latrine projects, in particular (investments 
intended for the poor), were conducted in less unequal villages. 
                                                 
24 Decentralised targeting is sometimes called “community-based targeting” in the literature. 
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Such a finding may, at first glance, appear paradoxical. It would normally be expected to be easier to 
pinpoint the poor in highly unequal communities and identify their needs. Galasso and Ravallion 
(2005) explain this finding in terms of the relative power of the poor in the local decision-making 
process: the greater the inequalities, the less voice the poor have in the decision-making processes. In 
other words, the more unequal the initial distribution of resources, the greater the non-poor’s chance of 
cornering the resources intended to help the poor. In such a situation, the local political economy tends 
to perpetuate the inequalities. This conclusion is also echoed in another criticism of decentralised 
targeting, which argues that this beneficiary selection mechanism tends to perpetuate the local power 
structures and exclude certain individuals from the social programmes for ethnic or moral reasons 
(Conning and Kevane, 2002). 
Nevertheless, these studies generally tend to put their conclusions into perspective. They point out 
that, although there is indeed a risk of poverty alleviation programme benefits being diverted in certain 
villages with high levels of inequality, the real problem does not lie there. It lies in the central 
government’s allocation of the resources to the local communities. Galasso and Ravallion (2005) find 
that the central government’s allocation of resources among the villages in Bangladesh is neutral to 
poverty, i.e. it does not depend on the communities’ poverty levels. They also show that the 
programme’s targeting performances are on the whole due to the allocation of resources within the 
village rather than the distribution of resources among the villages. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) 
draw similar conclusions. They find that the central level tends to allocate fewer resources to villages 
where poverty, inequalities and the proportion of low-caste individuals are high. Such findings put the 
case for a more transparent and equitable process when allocating resources from central government 
to the local authorities. 
 
Another risk of decentralisation lies in the generation of horizontal inequalities wherein the poor are 
treated differently depending on where they live. Looking again at the Chinese Di Bao programme, 
Ravallion (2009) shows that wealthier municipalities apply less restrictive eligibility criteria than 
poorer municipalities. Consequently, the poor in rich cities fare better from the programme than the 
poor in poor municipalities. This puts a strong brake on the programme’s impact on poverty reduction. 
4.3 Choosing the right targeting method for the circumstances 
Few available comparative studies evaluate the relative performances of the different targeting 
methods. This dearth is due to the fact that it is hard to put together a database on targeted policy 
performances across a broad enough spectrum of geographic, institutional and cultural situations, 
targeting methods and poverty reduction policy types to be able to separate out the effects of these 
different elements. 
 
The study by Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2004a, 2004b) is probably the most comprehensive cross-
cutting analysis of targeting performances. These authors compare 122 targeted poverty alleviation 
programmes in 48 developing countries. They use the normalised share of transfers received by the 
poorest 40% of individuals as their targeting performance indicator. Despite the considerable 
limitations of this indicator, as discussed in the previous section, this study presents three major 
findings. 
 
Firstly, the authors find that targeting is an efficient instrument for concentrating the benefits of the 
policies among the poor. Half of the programmes studied allocate at least 25% more transfers to the 
poor than the same programmes delivered in a non-targeted manner: “In this sense, targeting works,” 
(Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott, 2004b, p. 81). However, targeting is “regressive” in one-quarter of the 
programmes. In addition, the average performance of the targeted programmes studied is less than 1, 
i.e. “regressive”. 
 
Secondly, targeting performances are highly sensitive to the context surrounding policy 
implementation. First of all, they are positively correlated with the extent of democracy in the 
countries. In other words, the greater the people’s voice in the government’s choices, the more 
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accountable the government is to the people and the media for its actions,25 and the better the targeting 
performances. Large income distribution inequalities subsequently raise the targeting performances, 
since it is normally easier to identify the poor when inequalities are high as they stand out clearly from 
the non-poor. Lastly, targeting performances depend on the country’s level of wealth, which the 
authors say reflects the country’s institutional capacities to design and conduct a targeted policy. In 
sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the median targeted programme transfers 8% fewer resources to the 
poor than would have been transferred by the same type of non-targeted programme. Conversely, the 
“best” targeting performances are found in the Latin American and transition countries where 
institutions are stronger. 
 
The third conclusion that the authors come to is that no targeting method is strictly preferable to 
another in terms of targeting performance: “There is no clearly preferred method for all types of 
programs or all country contexts” (Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott, 2004a, p.84). In effect, in their 
sample of targeted programmes, only 20% of the variance between the different targeting 
performances is explained by the choice of targeting methods. The remaining 80% is due to 
differences within one and the same targeting method. 
 
This finding therefore underscores the importance of taking joint account of a range of considerations 
when choosing a targeting method: the objectives of the poverty reduction policy, especially the 
poverty definition used, and the programme’s proposed scale and duration, as well as the institutional 
environment, the data available, the country’s central and local administrative capacities, and the 
behavioural responses of the potential beneficiaries. 
 
Although it is not possible to rank the different targeting methods, the existing empirical literature can 
be used to present their relative advantages and disadvantages along with the contexts to which they 
appear to be the best suited. Table 3 does just this, based on the experiences analysed by Coady, Grosh 
and Hoddinott (2004a). 
 
Table 3: Comparison of targeting methods 
Targeting method Main advantages Main disadvantages Suitable context 
Individuals 
or 
households  
By means 
testing 
- Few inclusion and 
exclusion errors 
 
- Little risk of 
generating 
horizontal inequity 
- Substantial 
disincentive effects 
on households 
 
- High beneficiary 
identification costs 
(public and private) 
- Administrative system 
sufficiently developed to 
set up control and 
checking procedures 
 
- Transfer sums large 
enough to justify the 
high costs of 
identification or use of 
this identification by 
other programmes 
 
- Suitable for monetary 
poverty reduction 
policies, but does not 
cover other aspects of 
poverty 
 By proxy-
means 
testing 
- Few disincentive 
effects on 
households 
 
- Hard to rally 
political support 
because the selection 
criterion is not 
- Administrative system 
sufficiently developed 
for beneficiary selection 
(information collection 
                                                 
25 The level of democracy as defined and used by Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott corresponds to the Voice and 
Accountability indicator defined by Kaufman et al. (1999). 
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- Low risk of 
manipulation of 
information to meet 
the selection 
criterion 
 
- Selection of 
beneficiaries based 
on a lightweight 
survey 
always well 
understood 
 
- Rigid criterion 
poorly suited to 
standard-of-living 
changes 
 
- Reflects the average 
household’s standard 
of living well, but not 
so well the others 
 
- Requires the 
collection of 
information to 
identify the 
beneficiaries 
and application of the 
criterion) 
 
- Transfer sums large 
enough to justify the 
high costs of 
identification or use of 
this identification by 
other programmes 
 
- Suitable for chronic 
poverty alleviation 
policies. Unsuited to 
policies addressing 
vulnerability 
 By the 
communities 
- Captures 
information 
available solely at 
local level 
 
- Consideration of 
specific needs at 
local level  
- Potentially high 
political cost (risk of 
manipulation of the 
selection criteria, risk 
of undermining social 
cohesion in the 
community) 
 
- The local 
stakeholders’ goals 
are not necessarily 
the same as the 
programme’s goals 
 
- High risk of 
horizontal inequity 
- Small-scale programme 
(few beneficiaries 
possible, small sums 
distributed, short 
programme duration) 
 
- If the aim is to 
incorporate a more 
subjective dimension 
into the concept of 
poverty 
 
- Well-defined 
communities with strong 
social cohesion 
Categorical All - Administratively 
simple and 
moderate cost 
 
- Few disincentive 
effects and little 
stigma 
- Risk of generating 
horizontal inequity 
- Modest administrative 
capacities 
 
- Categories chosen 
sufficiently correlated 
with poverty 
 Geographic  - Targeting efficiency 
highly dependent on 
the quality of the 
available data 
- Homogeneous poverty 
levels within geographic 
areas and heterogeneous 
between areas 
 Demographic - Often popular  - Availability of 
exhaustive demographic 
data 
- Poverty concentrated 
within a demographic 
group 
Self-
targeting 
 - Targeting cost 
virtually zero 
- Strong stigma 
 
- Sometimes high 
private costs 
- Institutional or 
administrative capacities 
not very developed 
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- Inclusion of 
vulnerability in the 
definition of poverty 
 
- Consumption and 
labour supply behaviour 
highly different between 
poor and non-poor and 
similar among poor to 
limit horizontal inequity 
Source: The authors, adapted from Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2004a) 
 
Given the methods’ individual weaknesses and complementarities, many poverty alleviation policies 
use a number of them in tandem. For example, two-step targeting is commonly used: geographic areas 
are first of all targeted by poverty level, and then individuals or households or even demographic 
groups are targeted within these areas. Other combinations are possible, such as demographic targeting 
followed by individual targeting or, as in the case of the Mexican Oportunidades programme, 
geographic targeting following by proxy-means testing coupled with community-based targeting, or 
again in Mexico, where the government targeted priority zones within which the poor self-target to 
obtain products consumed mainly by the poor. Combining the different methods optimises policy 
targeting, as shown by Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2004a, 2004b).  
 
Conclusion 
 
This study reviews poverty reduction targeting performances in developing countries. An in-depth 
analysis of studies on this subject leads us to a first conclusion. We believe that the issue of the merits 
of targeting, always a subject of hot debate in the literature, is fuelled more by ideological positions 
than by any observation of the widespread failure of targeted policies. In fact, where resources are 
scarce, targeting appears to be an effective tool for poverty reduction provided that the methods used 
to target the poor are well-suited to the context in which they are implemented. Given that a mismatch 
between targeting methods and local realities can make a targeted policy less effective than a universal 
policy, the choice of mechanisms to identify the poor is of paramount importance. 
 
There is no easy answer to the question of the choice of targeting methods. Given the current state of 
knowledge, no targeting method stands out as being a cut above the rest in absolute terms. When 
choosing a targeting method, many aspects of the situation on the ground have to be taken into 
consideration. This review points up the wealth and relative flexibility of the palette of targeting 
methods. In addition, it presents an analytic framework to guide targeted poverty reduction 
policymakers in making the best choice. 
 
From a more theoretical standpoint, this review highlights the need to take forward research on the 
evaluation of targeted policies. Top of the list in this regard is thinking on targeting performance 
indicators. The most commonly used indicators at present provide little information on the poverty 
reduction impacts of the different targeting methods. Yet it is vital for targeting methods to be 
compared in the light of their contribution to the end goal of poverty alleviation policies. Secondly, 
very few comparative studies on targeting methods cover a broad enough spectrum to be able to 
separate out the different effects of context on the efficiency of the targeting methods. Work is called 
for in this area to refine the findings of these meta-analyses and test their robustness to other 
methodological choices. Another possible avenue of research is to take advantage of recent advances 
in policy impact evaluation by setting up experimental procedures to make a strict comparison of the 
different targeting methods. 
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